What limits did Kisor v. Wilkie place on Auer deference?

What limits did Kisor v. Wilkie place on Auer deference?

• A. Courts must ensure the regulation is genuinely ambiguous, analyze textual and contextual clues, and avoid broad, sweeping deference.
• B. Courts should defer broadly to agency interpretation whenever a regulation is involved.
• C. Only textual analysis matters.
• D. Regulation must be read literally only.

Answer: (A)

The key idea is that Kisor v. Wilkie narrows when courts may defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations. The test is not a blanket rule to defer; instead, courts must first determine that the regulation is genuinely ambiguous after using traditional methods of construction—carefully examining the text, its structure, purpose, and the broader regulatory context. Only if ambiguity remains may the court consider the agency’s interpretation, and even then the interpretation must be reasonable and consistent over time, not a post hoc rationalization or a broad, sweeping reading. This captures why the best answer says courts must ensure genuine ambiguity, analyze textual and contextual clues, and avoid broad, sweeping deference. The other choices misstate the limits: deferring broadly whenever a regulation is involved ignores the narrowing; focusing only on textual analysis omits the necessary contextual tools; and reading the regulation as literal only ignores the need to resolve genuine ambiguity through traditional interpretation and reasonableness.

The key idea is that Kisor v. Wilkie narrows when courts may defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations. The test is not a blanket rule to defer; instead, courts must first determine that the regulation is genuinely ambiguous after using traditional methods of construction—carefully examining the text, its structure, purpose, and the broader regulatory context. Only if ambiguity remains may the court consider the agency’s interpretation, and even then the interpretation must be reasonable and consistent over time, not a post hoc rationalization or a broad, sweeping reading. This captures why the best answer says courts must ensure genuine ambiguity, analyze textual and contextual clues, and avoid broad, sweeping deference. The other choices misstate the limits: deferring broadly whenever a regulation is involved ignores the narrowing; focusing only on textual analysis omits the necessary contextual tools; and reading the regulation as literal only ignores the need to resolve genuine ambiguity through traditional interpretation and reasonableness.